Sir

Biological weapons still form part of the world's arsenal, as the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq has underlined1. A weapons control system based on UN Security Council resolutions implies serious threats not just to national sovereignty but also to confidential information — an important concern in today's competitive academic and industrial environment. Since a treaty-based inspection regime relies on the willingness of states to sign the treaty, they have to be certain that their confidential information will remain secure.

Current negotiations in Geneva for a protocol to strengthen the biological weapons convention2 are likely to lead to a combined reporting–inspection system. As in the chemical weapons convention3, site inspections and inclusion of non-military sites are being discussed: two elements with far-reaching consequences for confidentiality issues. In addition to classical confidentiality provisions (such as guidelines, a commission, individual secrecy agreements, and restricted access to information), the selection of appropriate triggers for countries to make declarations under the protocol should weed out threats to the loss of confidential information.

The draft protocol confines required declarations of research and development to listed agents and toxins, biological defence and maximum containment facilities. The current talks are still discussing the scope of inspections and when they should be held2 — for example, should they be random? Inspections will be based on mandates defining the purpose of the inspection, ranging from confidence-building, auditing and clarifying information to investigating a suspected breach of the biological weapons convention.

Until now, concerns about the risk to confidential information have not been substantiated by declarations based on the current draft protocol and several practice inspections.

The trend to incorporate private institutions can also be seen in other international agreements, such as the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters4 and the draft Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity5.

In order to increase public and political acceptance of biological research and biotechnology, confidentiality issues and the need for more transparency will have to be brought into balance.