Dissociating types of mental computation

Abstract

A fundamental issue in the study of cognition and the brain is the nature of mental computation. How far does this depend on internally represented systems of rules, expressed as strings of symbols with a syntax, as opposed to more distributed neural systems, operating subsymbolically and without syntax? The mental representation of the regular and irregular past tense of the English verb has become a crucial test case for this debate. Single-mechanism approaches argue that current multilayer connectionist networks can account for the learning and representation both of regular and of irregular forms^1,2. Dual-mechanism approaches, although accepting connectionist accounts for the irregular forms, argue that a symbolic, rule-based system is required to explain the properties of the regular past tense and, by extension, the properties of language and cognition in general^3,4,5. We show here that the regular and irregular past tense are supported by different neural systems, which can become dissociated by damage to the brain^6,7. This is evidence for functional and neurological distinctions in the types of mental computation that support these different aspects of linguistic and cognitive performance.