Abstract
PROF. DAWES HICKS and Mr. Adrian Coates agree in their decisive rejection of any form of subjective idealism and in their vigorous repudiation of an idealistic interpretation of physics. They both expend much trouble upon criticizing various forms of sensum or sense-data theories; they are both concerned to deny that a sense-datum is an object, and they seek to draw important conclusions from this denial. They diverge, however, so widely in their respective conceptions of, and methods of approach to, philosophical problems that, even when they reach the same conclusions, the grounds upon which their acceptance of these conclusions are based are entirely different.
(1) Critical Realism:
Studies in the Philosophy of Mind and Nature. By Prof. G. Dawes Hicks. Pp. xxiv + 346. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1938.) 15s. net.
(2) A Basis of Opinion
By Adrian Coates. Pp. xvii + 461. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1938.) 16s. net.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution
Access options
Subscribe to this journal
Receive 51 print issues and online access
$199.00 per year
only $3.90 per issue
Buy this article
- Purchase on Springer Link
- Instant access to full article PDF
Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
STEBBING, L. Epistemology and Anti-Metaphysics. Nature 142, 656–657 (1938). https://doi.org/10.1038/142656a0
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/142656a0
