Abstract
IN discussions which have taken place recently in the columns of NATURE, and elsewhere, on the subject of determinism, various aspects of the problem are omitted which appear to me to be important. In the first place, both determinism and indeterminism are subjective phenomena, dependent on mind, and subject to its limitations, including fallibility. Secondly, they are eternally associated in mind, and become meaningless in isolation. A universe ruled entirely by determinism is to me as unthinkable as one subject to pure chance. The difficulty is with our human minds to attempt to adjust ourselves to a world which appears to be partly determined and partly fortuitous.
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WEATHERALL, R. Determinism. Nature 129, 509–510 (1932). https://doi.org/10.1038/129509a0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/129509a0
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