Ueber den Willensakt und das Temperament: eine experimentellc Untersuchung

Abstract

TO the layman an act of volition is one of those obvious things, such as gravity or growth, which present no difficulty and suggest no problem. Their mechanism is so smooth in its working that the mind never dreams of the presence of a mystery. Add to which the fact that it is impossible to go through the process of willing and at the same time to contemplate and observe the process. Yet at least one difficulty has been noted by the crudest philosophy for ages past—the power of choice, the so-called freedom of the will. This, however, as Prof. Ach observes, is a function not of the will but of reason. He also well insists that the judgment “I can do that which I will,” has two distinct meanings, which have often been confused. The one meaning is positive, “I have the capacity to carry out what I will”; “can” being equivalent to posse, pouvoir, overmögen. The other is negative, “It is my wish to do what I will.” Psychologists are only too well aware that “In no department of the science of mind does there prevail greater confusion and uncertainty than in that of Volition.”

Ueber den Willensakt und das Temperament: eine experimentellc Untersuchung.

By Prof. Narziss Ach. Pp. xii + 324. (Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer, 1910.) Price 6.50 marks.