Psychologie Erfahrungswissenschaft Primer of Psychology Outlines of Descriptive Psychology Versuch einer Darstellung der Empfindungen

Abstract

THE marked difference in contents and tone of the four works before us is a striking proof of the extent and variety of the topics embraced in the modern science of psychology. By far the most original and important of the four is the work of H. Cornelius, which treats the problems of psychology, in the main, from the epistemological point of view, with unusual carefulness of statement, and still more unusual lucidity of style. The author is clearly familiar with the recent literature of the subject, English and French as well as German; but the writers whose influence is most clearly traceable in his treatment of his material are both Germans, Avenarius and Mach. The author's attitude towards the main problems of psychological science may be briefly summarised as follows:—Psychology, as the science of “psychical facts,” is the only possible basis of a sound general philosophy. Its special task is, by describing those psychical facts in the simplest possible terms, to explain the growth and meaning of the more or less artificial and complicated hypotheses which we frame to ourselves in every-day life, and in scientific reflection, about the nature of the world. In pursuance of this task Mr. Cornelius first devotes a chapter to the question, “What are the ultimate elements into which mental processes can be resolved by analysis?” and then proceeds to trace in detail the formation of derivative psychical products of ever-increasing complexity. In this way he passes in review, one after another, all the most important concepts of physics, æsthetics and ethics. The most noticeable feature of the chapter on the elementary processes is the admission of “ideas” by the side of sensations as a distinct class of primitive mental facts. It is significant that the two best “Psychologies” of recent years, those of Stout and Ebbinghaus, agree in this rejection of the old theory that an “idea” is merely a weaker “impression.” Among the many admirable things in Mr. Cornelius' work, which space will not allow me to mention in detail, specially admirable are the careful and elaborate account in Chapter ii. of the growth and meaning of the concept of objective existence and the discussion of the concept of “truth” in Chapter vi. Mr. Cornelius' philosophical position is, as becomes a follower of Avenarius, one of “naive realism ”; that is, he contents himself with explaining how the plain man's ordinary notions of objective existence, of things and of causes, naturally arise from the workings of the psychological mechanism; and he abstains from any metaphysical theories as to the agreement or disagreement of these notions with “reality.” Perhaps it may be necessary to remark, for the benefit of any one to whom the term is new, that “naive realism” is, in fact, almost the same doctrine as the “idealism” of Berkeley's “Three Dialogues.”

Psychologie Erfahrungswissenschaft.

By H. Cornelius. Pp. v + 445. (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1897.)

Primer of Psychology.

By E. B. Titchener. Pp. ix + 314. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898.)

Outlines of Descriptive Psychology.

By G. T. Ladd. Pp. xi + 428. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898.)

Versuch einer Darstellung der Empfindungen.

By W. Przibram. Pp. 28, with five plates. (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1898.)