Sir

SIR — In their Essay 'The end of the science superpowers' (Nature 454, 412–413; 2008), J. R. Hollingsworth and colleagues argue that the pattern of rise and decline of science superpowers such as France, Germany and Britain is now catching up with the United States. Surprisingly, they see a shift not towards Chinese scientific hegemony but towards multipolarity.

They argue that the decline of the United States indicates the end of a model of scientific production, that 'big' science is finished and that small interdisciplinary institutes, where new ideas can flourish, are taking over. In this context of altered dynamics, they conclude that US science can prosper alongside contributions from elsewhere.

This argument ignores a persistent pattern in the history of science. Calls for interdisciplinarity and creativity always arise when leaders are confronted with new competition from outside. Such calls are often a sign that the callers are losing this competition.

One of the strengths of science is that its rules of engagement are clear, making it possible for anyone to participate if they take the effort to learn the rules. This means that there is always room for newcomers taking scientific development to its next logical step, overtaking formerly dominant elites. As the authors point out, this happened to France in the mid-nineteenth century, to Germany in the 1920s, and to Britain after the Second World War.

A typical reaction of elites under threat is to raise entry barriers to their circle by placing emphasis on knowledge unavailable to newcomers. For example, they may trade the universal language of their science for methods relying on culturally specific 'general knowledge' and interdisciplinary meta-perspectives that come only with a broad education. Laborious scientific methods no longer suffice; creativity and reflection count. For outsiders, the road to success by acquiring leadership in specialized fields is blocked.

History teaches us that discourses of interdisciplinarity and creativity offer temporary refuge for embattled elites, but eventually do not stop the process of shifting scientific hegemony. They result in isolated, inward-looking scientific communities. Much of the post-hegemonic academic discourse in France and Germany illustrates this. If the United States is to avoid this fate, it should increase scientific funding rather than trying to shield itself from competition by changing the rules.