Abstract
THE view that induction is an operation of valid inference of the same kind as deduction, expounded notably by John Stuart Mill, has been rightly rejected by modern scientists and philosophers. Instead, the growth of scientific understanding is looked on as a hypothetico-deductive activity. According to this view, hypotheses or theories are created, subsuming far more than the known facts they are intended to explain; they are tested for internal logical consistency and compatibility with the known facts; and implications are deduced from them for test by further observation or experiment. If such a test is adequately carried out and gives a negative result, the theory is scrapped or, alternatively, modified so as to be compatible with the new facts. Thus theories (if they have an adequate degree of generality) cannot be absolutely verified, though they can be absolutely falsified. Supporting evidence can corroborate them—strengthen our reasons for believing that they are true—but not verify them.
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MELTZER, B. General: Generation of Hypotheses and Theories. Nature 225, 972 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1038/225972a0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/225972a0
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