Abstract
WE do not make a general statement to the effect that subjective probabilities in all situations diminish with increase in age, but merely refer to the subjective probability of winning the uncertain prizes in our particular experiments. Secondly, we do not speak of subjective estimates of probability but of ‘subjective probability’. That is, our subjects do not make any estimates of probabilities. Indeed, these are explicitly stated to them. What they do is make a choice or express a preference; and this choice or preference is perhaps influenced by their subjective assessment of the value of the prize—the point which Prof. Heath emphasizes—as well as by how likely they think they are of getting it. We have no indication that our subjects distinguish between these two components in making their choice. We referred in particular to the second component but do not wish to deny the possible significance of the first. Indeed, we explicitly stated in the last sentence of our communication that the subjective probability on which the preference is based is affected by the value of the prizes offered. On the other hand, if the explanation rested only on the supposed reduction with age in the “imagined appetite for sweets”, we should also have to conclude that this appetite increases with intelligence.
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COHEN, J., HANSEL, C. Subjective Probability, Gambling and Intelligence. Nature 181, 1620 (1958). https://doi.org/10.1038/1811620b0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/1811620b0
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