Abstract
A NEW phenomenon has appeared in modern physics, namely, an attempt to apply with rigour the principle that only that which is observable is significant. This is not intended to be a precise statement of the principle. It is at least vague, and perhaps inaccurate, but on that very account it is the most suitable statement with which to begin our discussion. For the principle itself has not yet been clearly isolated from its applications. Consequently it is manifested here in one form and there in another, appearing to some as an outstanding example of scientific arrogance and even absurdity, while to others it has an authority which raises it above common sense and reason alike. It is therefore important to try to understand the meaning of the principle and to reach a point of view from which its validity may be justly appraised.
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References
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DINGLE, H. Science and the Unobservable. Nature 141, 21–28 (1938). https://doi.org/10.1038/141021a0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/141021a0
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Science, Logic and Philosophy*
Nature (1938)